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IN THE SUPREME COURT
0 F THE STATE OF UTAH
1

TED W. HILLSTEAD and ROBERT
B. JACKSON,
Plaintiffs amd Appellants,
Case No.

vs.
.J. J. LEA VITT and P.R. LEAVITT,
his wife, and WAYNE H. SIPE,
Defendants and Respondents.

12028

RESPO,NDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiffs to enforce a Nevada
Court Judgment against the Defendant, J. J. Leavitt, to
set aside as a fraud upon creditors an alleged conveyance
made by said Defendant to his wife and co-defendant, P.
R. Leavitt, and to have a Receiver appointed to preserve
the conveyed property, and to collect damages against
Defendants, J. J. Leavitt and Wayne H. Sipe, for breach
of a Uniform Real Estate Contract made and executed
in the State of Nevada.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT
The trial court denied the Motion of the Defendants,
J. J. Leavitt and P.R. Leavitt, to dismiss Plaintiffs' First
I

Cause of Action and granted to Plaintiffs a judgment
thereon and extended full faith and credit to the Nevada
Court judgment. Judgment for the Defendants was
granted on Plaintiffs' Second and Third Cause of Action,
and the same were dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs
subsequently moved the Law and Motion Division of the
Court for Garnishee Judgment and the Motion was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants, J. J. Leavitt and P. R. Leavitt, seek to
sustain that part of the Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs'
Second and Third Cause of Action with prejudice and
that Order denying Plaintiffs a Garnishee Judgment.
Defendants seek a reversal of the trial court's denial
of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action and a judgment by this Court holding that the Nevada
Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
original action herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 6, 1965, Plaintiffs entered into a Uniform
Real Estate Contract with Defendants, J. J. Leavitt and
Wayne H. Sipe, wherein said Defendants agreed to purchase from Plaintiffs, certain property in Las Vegas,
Nevada. Possession of the property was granted to said
Defendants, as of April 1, 1965, and as a down payment,
said Defendants agreed to deed Plaintiffs two mining
properties i'n Colorado. The contract failed to provide
for a time when said conveyance should be made or for
2

when payments should be made on the obligations assmned by the Defendants. (Ex. 1-D, Nevada R. p. 3)
On June 21, 1965, an action was commenced purportedly on behalf of the Defendants, J. J. Leavitt and Wayne
H. Sipe, in the District Court of Clark County, State of
Nevada, to collect rents from the Plaintiffs herein. (Ex.
1-D, Nevada R. pp. 1, 2) A counterclaim was filed by said
Plaintiffs, alleging that Defendants, J. J. Leavitt and
Wayne H. Sipe, failed and refused to apply rents received
from the Las Vegas property to the payment of certain
obligations contained in the April 6, 1965 contract, that
the holder of the First Deed of Trust against said property had commenced foreclosure proceedings, that it was
"estimated" that said Plaintiffs herein would be personally liable for a deficiency judgment in an amount of
$50,000.00, incident to said foreclosure and, without giving
further detail, that said Defendants, J. J. Leavitt and
Wayne H. Sipe, were personally liable to said Plaintiffs
herein as a result of such "fraudulent action." (Ex. 1-D,
Nevada R. p. 6) Defendant J. J. Leavitt, had no knowlPdge of said counterclaim until October, 1967. (R. 188)

An Affidavit in Support of a Motion for Smnmary
Judgment was filed by Plaintiffs herein on July 20, 1967.
(Ex. 1-D, Nevada R. p. 17) It contained a recital of
payments not made by Defendants, J. J. Leavitt and
Wayne H. Sipe, together with the following paragraph:
"4(f) That (Leavitt et al) have further fraudulently attempted to convey property mentioned in
said Uniform Real Estate Contract to which they
did not have title, namely, the two mines in Silver-

ton, San Juan County, Colorado, known as Forst,
containing 10.331 acres (Survey #18463, and Winnemucca, M.S., containing 5.0 acres (Survey
with a stated value of approximately $51,700.00. (Ex. 1-D, Nevada R. p. 18)"
The Affidavit concluded:
"8. That as a result of the Plaintiffs' false and
fraudulent acts, and their failure to perform as
provided in the contract, the Defendants have been
damaged as follows :
(a) $51,700.00- the stated value of the property attempted to be conveyed to the Defendants as provided in paragraph 4(f)
above.
(b) The sum of $2,650.00 paid by the Defendants to Homer W. and Beith P. Hansen, which liability the Defendants agreed
to assume and pay, and which the Plaintiffs have failed to pay." (Ex. 1-D, Nevada R. p.19)
On September 27, 1967, the Order for Summary
Judgment and .Judgment relied on herein was entered.
(Ex. 1-D, Nevada R. p. 29) This Order recited the facts
upon which judgment was based, including the following:

"4. That Plaintiffs further fraudulently represented to Defendants that they had title to certain
real property located in Silverton, San Juan
County, Colorado, more particularly described as
follows:
2 mines in Silverton, San Juan County, Colorado, known as Forst, containing 10.331 acres
(Survey U8463), and "Winnemucca, M.S., containing 5.0 acres (Survey #563B),
4

which
were to be the down payment on
the U mfonn Real Estate Contract mentioned
above with a value stated in the contract to be
$51,700.00." (Ex.1-D NevadaR. p. 30)
"7. That as of November 7, 1966, Defendants
have been required to pay the sum of $2,650.00 to
Homer W. and Beth P. Hansen upon obligations
which Plaintiffs agreed to assume and pay." (Ex.
1-D Nevada R. p. 31)
The Nevada Court thereupon granted Summary
.Judgment to Plaintiffs and decreed:
"that the Defendants, TED W. HILLSTEAD and
ROBERT B. JACKSON, do have and recover
from Plaintiffs, WAYNE H. SIPE and J. J.
LEAVITT, the sum of $54,350.00 as damages incurred by Defendants as a result of Plaintiffs
frarudulently entering into the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated April 6, 1965, with the intent
and subsequent failure to meet any of the obligations they had agreed to assume under said contract, together with interest upon said sum of $54350.00 at the rate of 7% per annum from the date
of Judgment until paid, together with costs in
this action" (Emphasis added) (Ex. 1-D, Nevada
R., p. 32)
On November 17, 1967, Plaintiffs filed thi·s action
petitioning the trial court to give full faith and credit to
the Nevada Judgment; to set aside an alleged conveyance
by the Defendant, J. J. Leavitt, to the Defendant, P. R.
Leavitt as fraudulent as to Plaintiffs and to appoint a
'
Receiver for the conveyed property, (R-1-3) and pursuant to an amended complaint, to award damages for
breach of the Nevada contract. ( R. 49-50)
5

Defendants, J. J. Leavitt and P.R. Leavitt, contracted to purchase a farm property in Hagerman, Idaho, in
1960, taking title thereto in both of their names. (R. 185)
The property was thereafter lost or forfeited to the parties from whom it was being purchased. (J. J. Leavitt
Dep. pp. 12, 13) Said Defendants thereafter contracted
to purchase a farm in Pingree, Idaho, in 1962 (R. 176)
with both of their names appearing on the contract (R.
182). They made a $25.00 down payment incident to that
contract and thereafter lost or forfeited the property.
(R.177).
Certain livestock and equipment acquired by said Defendants incident to their contract on the Hagerman
property was transferred to the Pingree property (R.
185) and upon the loss of the Pingree property, was
traded by said Defendants for certain real property in
Provo, Utah, (R. 177, 179) which was taken in the name
of the Defendant, P. R. Leavitt. (R. 179, 186) Sixty
or ninety days thereafter, the Provo property was traded
for a lodge in Jackson Hole, ·wyoming (R. 177, 179) and
title to that property was again taken in the name of P.
R. Leavitt. (R 182, 183, 186) The transaction was consummated in 1963 or 1964. (R. 182)
In about October of 1964, said Defendants found it
necessary to raise funds to meet medical expenses of the
Defendant, P. R. Leavitt and, therefore, mortgaged the
Wyoming property; the Defendant, J. J. Leavitt, signing
the mortgage agreement at the demand of the mortgagee.
(R.183) The property was thereafter placed in the namt'S
of the Defendants, J. J. Leavitt and P. R. Leavitt, inci
fj

dent to a vVyoming attorney's recommendation that such
was necessary in view of J. J. Leavitt's execution of the
mortgage and in order to clear the property for re-sale.
(R. 183)
The Wyoming property was sold on a Real Estate
Contract ·with a Dry Cleaning Business taken as part
payment under that contract. (R. 178, 180) The contract
was subsequently traded for the Alpine Motel in Price,
Utah, title to which was taken and remains only in the
name of the Defendant, P. R. Leavitt. (R. 180, 181, 186)
'11 he Dry Cleaning Business was traded for an apartment
house, title to ·which was also taken by P. R. Leavitt (R.
180,181)
Title to the Utah County, Wyoming and Price, Utah
properties was taken in the name of P. R. Leavitt, since
the properties belonged to her (R. 186), the same having
been acc1uired indirectly from her initial investment of
proceeds derived from her sale, years earlier, of a Stradirnrius Violin. (R. 184)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE ABSENCE OF
AN ACTUAL INTENT TO DEFRAUD CREDITORS INHERENT IN THE TRANSFER BETWEEN DEFENDANTS J. J.
LEAVITT AND P.R. LEAVITT.

The only
or value which may have been enjoyed by the Defendant, J. J. Leavitt, from the Hagerman
and Pingret>, Ida110 transactions consisted of the livestock
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and equipment subsequently traded for the Provo, Utah
properties, (R. 177, 179, 185) and which properties were
taken in the name of the Defendant, P.R. Leavitt. (R. 179,
186) Such livestock and equipment had been indirectly
acquired with proceeds derived by P.R. Leavitt from her
sale of a Stradivarius Violin. (R. 184) J. J. Leavitt
made no contribution toward the acquisition of the livestock and equipment and any interest which he may have
enjoyed therein, would have represented a gift to him
from P. R. Leavitt. Even in the event that J. J. Leavitt
did enjoy an interest in that property, any such interest
was transferred by him to P. R. Leavitt, pursuant to her
taking of legal title to the Provo, Utah properties received
in trade for that livestock and equipment. P. R. Leavitt
then traded the Provo property, in 1963 or 1964, (R. 182)
for property in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, again taking
title in her name alone (R. 182, 183, 186). These transfers
were all prior in time to the obligations flowing between
Plaintiffs and J. J. Leavitt incident to the Nevada contract of April 6, 1965, (Ex. 1-D, Nevada R. p. 3) and,
therefore, not contemporary to the contractual obligations
subject to the Nevada Judgment. Plaintiffs therefore acquired the character of future creditors as regards this
alleged gratuitious transfer by J. J. Leavitt to P. R.
Leavitt.
Plaintiffs suggest that they need only make a showing of constructive fraud to set aside the· transfers of
which they complain. They refer this Court to the case
of Ned J. Bowman Company v. White, 13 Utah 2d 173,
369 P 2d 962, for the proposition that any conveyance for
insufficient consideration which renders the conveying
8

party insolvent, may be set aside under the Fraudulent
Conveyance provisions of our Code. Plaintiffs also make
reference to the case of Cardon v. Harper, 106 Utah 560,
151 P2d 99, for the further proposition that a conveyance
between husband and wife can be set aside without the
necessity of showing actual fraudulent intent. However,
these cases must be distinguished from the instant case,
since they were concerned with present creditors holding
existent and matured claims at the time of the transfer
in question. In the Bowman case, the Court determined
that:
"Under our statutes, a creditor with a matured
claim may have a conveyance set aside . . . A
creditor may also have a conveyance set aside if
it was made with actual intent to hinder, delay or
defraud either present or future credito rs." (Emphasis added) 13 Utah 2d 175, (Citing 25-1-15(1),
25-1.-3 and 25-1-7, U.C.A., 1953)
1

In the Bowman and Cardon cases, the Court was confronted with a present creditor holding a claim which was
in existence and mature at the time of the conveyance in
question. Such a conveyance is obviously within the
contemplation of 25-1-4, U.C.A., 1953, and can be avoided
without a showing of actual intent to defraud.
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs occupy positions
of future creditors holding claims predicated upon obligations not in existence at the time of the taking of title
by P. R. Leavitt to the Provo, Utah properties and the
Jackson Hole, Wyoming property. Plaintiffs therefore
incurred the obligation of proving that J. J. Leavitt
entertained an actual intent to defraud creditors, contemporary with any gratuitous transfer by him to P. R.
9

--

-- -

--

-

-

Leavitt and incident to the latter's taking of title to the
Provo, Utah, properties. Section 25-1-7, U.C.A., 1953,
provides:
"Every conveyance made, and every obligation
incurred, with acfoal intent, as distinguislwd from
intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay or defraud
either present or future creditors is fraudulent
as to both present and fiditre creditors." (Emphasis added)
Section 25-1-7 incoqJorates the concept made manifest by the courts of this country and supported with authorities cited in 37 Am. Jnr. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances,
as follows:
'' ... if the property was conveyed by the debtor
·without actual fraudulent intention, the subsequent creditor may not qut>stion the transaction,
although the convE>yance ma>, have been voluntary
or without consideration." 37 Am Jur 2d Sec. 139
"vVhereas the familiar indicia or badges of fraud
ma>', in many instances, be relied on by an existing
creditor as establishing a case for the granting of
relief, it is not sufficient for a subsequent creditor
to make out a case of merely constructive fraud,
founded on such facts as lack of consideration or
insolvency on the part of the tr an sferor: he mnst
establish fraud in fact or actual fraud, and he
must assume thP. burden of proof in this rPs1wet.''
Ibid. Sec.143
The Plaintiffs point to the event by which the title to
the Wyoming property was temporarily held by J. J.
Leavitt along with P. R. Leavitt and suggest that the
subsequent trade of that propert>' for the Price, Utah,
property constituted a gratnitions and frandnlent transfer to P. R. Leavitt. Howewr, the facts hefon, tJw trial
lU

comt show that the .Wyoming property wa:s taken solely
in the name of P.R. Leavitt prior to the date of Plaintiffs
N eva<la contract with J. J. Leavitt, that title thereto was
suhsequently placed in the name of J. J. Leavitt at the demand of the mortgagee lending funds against the property
and at the suggestion of legal counsel. Such was not intended as a conveyance of a legal interest between P. R.
Leavitt and J. J. Leavitt, but only as a convenience by
which to acquire funds to meet medical expenses and
facilitate the sale of the property.
The facts establish only that a tr an sfer was made by
.J. J. Leavitt to his wife, P. R. Leavitt, prior to the date
of any obligation to or contractual relationship with
Plaintiffs and that the value so transferred was attributable to an investment initially made by P. R.
Leavitt from her own funds and that the properties
acquired incident to that investment belong to P. R.
Lc>avitt and wc>re intended to remain her separate propFnrther and in the event that the transfer to P.
R. Leavitt was, in fact, gratuitions, no facts were before
the ( 'ourt, jnstifying any finding of actual fraud.
POINT II.
REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO ALLOW TESTIMONY
GOING TO THE CREDIT STATUS OF THE DEFENDANT,
J. J. LEA VITT, WAS NOT IMPROPER.

The questions propounded by Plaintiffs' counsel to
Def Pndant, .T. ,J. Leavitt, and not allowed by the Court,
( R. 18G, 187) were improverly framed in a manner which
eonld Plicit te.stimon:< not relevant to the iss1ws before the
eourt. The inqHiry into the Diofendant's past involve11

ment in "lawsuits" drew no distinction between civil
and criminal actions nor between actions in which the Defendant appeared as Plaintiff, rather than as Defendant.
The question making reference to the Defendant's credit
rating wa:s overly vague. His credit rating, as such, would
not have been relevant to the issues under determination.
Both questions failed to make reference to the period of
time with which the court was concerned and neither was
framed in a manner which would elicit evidence as to
any fraudulent intention entertained by the Defendant
at the time of the conveyances in question and, therefore,
were properly denied.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
EVIDENCE AS TO DAMAGES INCURRED BY THE PLAINTIFFS SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE OF THE NEVADA
JUDGMENT.

It is elementary that Plaintiffs could not have the
Nevada Court re-open its judgment for the purpose of
taking testimony incident to the alleged damages accruing
subsequent to the date of that judgment and in order to
increase the amount of the damages awarded pursuant
to that judgment. The Nevada Judgment, on its face,
awards the total damages incident to the alleged "fraudulent actions" of the Defendants, J. J. Leavitt and Wayne
H. Sipe. It is inconsistent to petition the Utah Trial Court
to do with the Nevada judgment something which the
Nevada Court itself would have refused to do. The action
commenced by Plaintiffs is of necessity solely limited
to an attempt to obtain full faith and credit in Utah for
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the Nevada Judgment and for enforcement of that Judgment. The trial court properly refused what would have
amounted to a re-opening of the Nevada Judgment for
purposes of taking testimony incident to the altering of
that J ndgment.
POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR GARNISHEE JUDGMENT.

The testimony relied upon by Plaintiffs incident to
their Motion for Garnishee Judgment indicated that J.
J. Leavitt was the only individual authorized to write
checks on the Alpine Motel account. (R. 141, 142) Nowhere in evidence is there an indication that the funds
reached by Plaintiffs' Writ of Garnishment were owned
by J. J. Leavitt, that the Alpine Motel was indebted to
him or that he had any interest in assets of the motel.
The initial Answer to Garnishment indicated only that
the motel and/or J. J. Leavitt might have an interest
in the bank account. (R. 121) The Amended Answer to
Garnishment indicated the account was in the name of
the Alpine Motel, that J. J. Leavitt was an authorized
signatory on that account and that P.R. Leavitt claimed
sole title to said account and that the Garnishee was unable to determine whether J. J. Leavitt had any interest
in that account. (R. 124) The Amended Answer brought
the proceeding directly within the contemplation of Rule
64 D (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
in part:
""\\Then the answer of the garnishee discloses that
any person other than the defendant claims the

13

indebtedness or property in his hands, the court
may on motion order that such claimant be interpleaded as a defendant to the garnishee action,
and notice thereof, in such form as the court shall
direct, together with a copy of the order, shall be
served upon third party claimant in the manner
required for the service of a summons. Thereupon
the garnishee may pay or deliver to the court
such indebtedness or property, which shall be a
complete discharge from au liability to any party
for the amount so paid or property so delivered.
The third party claimant shall thereupon be deemed a defendant to the garnishee action and shall
answer within 10 clays, setting forth his claim or
clef ense.''
Plaintiffs failed to utilize the procedures afforded
by Rule G4 D (1) and failed to file their reply to the
Answer of the Garnishee as required by Rule. 64 D (h),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court has previously
ruled in Remington-Rand, Inc. v. O'Neil, 4 Utah 2d 270,
293 P.2d 416, that it is error for a court to grant a judgment against a garnishee ·where a Reply to Answer of
Garnishee has not been served upon that Garnishee.
The evidence before the Court was not sufficient
to establish that the Dt>fendant, J. J. Leavitt, mvned any
interest in the subject bank account and this, together
with Plaintiffs' failure to avail themselves of the procedures afforded by Rule G4 D, Utah Rnll's of Civil Procedure, supports the Court's denial of garnishee judgment.

14

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT BECAUSE:
A.

THE NEV ADA COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO
DETERMINE ISSUES NOT RAISED BY THE
PLEADINGS.

As set forth herein, the pleadings and counterclaim
in the Nevada Court do not raise the issue of liability of
Defendant, J. J. Leavitt, for damages or fraud arising out
of a failure to convey the Colorado mining property. The
April 6, 1965 contract does not indicate a date for performance by Leavitt, no damages arising out of the claimed failure to convey are asserted in the counterclaim and
no particular allegations of fraud are made as required
by Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 9 (b). The only
specific allegations of fraud were made in an affidavit
in support of a Motion for Summary Judgment filed two
years later.
The counterclaim upon which Smmnary Judgment
was granted was based on the alleged breach of a Utah
Uniform Real Estate Contract. The prayer of the Counterclaim was for $50,000.00 which Plaintiffs claimed was
the "estimated liability" to them arising out of a foredosnre ivhich had not occurred. However, judgment was
granted for the stated value of Colorado property "attempted to be conyey0d to Plaintiffs" and for fraudulent
adivities not specified in the counterclaim.

15

It is well established that in the absence of a statute
to the contrary, the relief to be awarded by a judgment
should be consistent with, and limited to, that sought by
the pleadings or incidental thereto. 49 CJS, Judgments,
Sec. 49. Cf. Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 288 P.2d 793.
It is also elementary that:
"Judgments must be responsive to the issues presented in the pleadings ... and issues not so raised
may not be determined . . .
A judgment on issues not made by the pleadings
is at least erroneous; but may be set aside or reversed in a proper proceeding for that purpose;
but many cases go further, and hold that judgments based on issues not made by the pleadings
or litigated by the parties are coram non judice
and void, at least insofar as they go beyond such
issues, on the theory that the court has no jurisdiction to pass on questions not submitted to it for
decision. If the accessive part of the judgment
cannot be readily separated from that which is
within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of
the pleadings and proof, the entire judgment has
been held void." 49 CJS, Judgments, Sec. 50.

This is the rule in Nevada where it is held that a judgment which adjudges matters outside of the issues raised
hy the pleadings is void. Douglas Milling and Power
Co. v. Rickey, 47 Nev.148, 217 Pac. 590; Shultz v. Mexican
Dam & Ditch Co., 47 Nev. 453, 224 Pac. 804

In the case of Reynolds v. 8tockt011, 140 U.S. 254 (11
S. Ct. 773), 35 L. Ed., 464, the United States Supreme
Court first considered the question of whether a foreign
judgment not responsive to the pleadings before the Court
was entitled to full faith and credit by the courts of a
16

sister state. In that case, a New York Life Insurance
Company, prior to 1872, deposited funds with the New
York State Superintendent of Insurance for protection
of policy holders. Thereafter, and in 1872, a New Jersey
Life Insurance Company re-insured the risks of the New
York company, took over its assets and assumed its liabilities. In 1877, the New Jersey company failed and the
New Jersey Court of Chancery appointed Joel Parker,
receiver of its assets. This receiver was subsequently
appointed as ancillary receiver by the New York Supreme
Court in a suit instituted therein against the New York
State Superintendent of Insurance and the New York receiver. The receiver resigned his appointment in New
.T ersey and was succeeded by Robert Stockton. No substitution of receivers was made in New York.

In 1886, New York Supreme Court ordered that its
New York receiver be discharged and pay funds in his
hand1> over to the New .Jersey receiver. Subsequently
thereto, the New York Supreme Court ordered Joel Parker as receiver of the New Jersey company assets, to pay
such over to Plaintiffs of the action pending before it.
The Plaintiff's Complaint, although joining Joel Parker
as receiver (to which he filed an answer) did not specify
a cause of action against him, nor did the prayer of said
Complaint request relief against him. The scope and object of the suit, as interpreted by the Court, was to reach
funds deposited with the Superintendent of Insurance Department of New York, Defendant, Joel Parker (and successor, Robert Stockton) answered that judgment was not
responsive to issnE"S presented in the pleadings and that
there was lack of jurisdiction over his person.
17

The New Jersey Court refused to give full faith
and credit to the New York judgment and that decision
was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In writing the majority opinion for the Supreme
Court, Mr. Justice Brewer noted:
"Full faith and credit demanded by the Constitution is only that faith and credit which the judicial
proceedings had in the other state in and of themselves required. In does not demand that a judgment rendered ... by a court which has jurisdicti on of the person, but which is in no way responsit0e to the issues tendered by the pleadings and is
rendered in the actual absence of the Defendant,
must be recognized as valid in the courts of any
other state." (Emphasis added.)
"It has been adjudged that the constitutional provision (Sec 1 of Article IY of U.S. Constitutionfull faith and credit clause) ... does not forbid
inquiry in the courts of the ·state to which the judgment is presented as to the jurisdiction of the
court in which it was rendered over the person, or
in respect to the subject matter ... If the fact of
a judgment rendered in a court of one state does
not preclude
in the courts of another, as to
the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment over the person or subject matter, it certainly also does not prelude inquiry as to whether the
judgment so rendered was so far responsive to the
issue tendered by the pleadings as to be a proper
exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the court
rendering it."
Incident to its above rulings, the Court sustained the
New Jersey Court decision and held that the New Jersey
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Court need not give full faith and credit to the New York
decision.
This Court has taken a similar position regarding the
lack of responsiveness of a foreign judgment. In this regard, see Stewart v. Layton, 4 Utah 2nd 134, 288 P. 2d 793,
in which the Court ruled that in giving full faith and
credit to judgment of sister state, it is not necessary to
give any more faith and credit than that accorded by the
sister state itself.
The Court has aptly summarized the law in this regard in the case of Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83.
It there said, when asked to review a California judgment:
"It matters not what Court acts. Every Court
must acquire jurisdiction from its record which
every Court must have and keep and which binds
the Court; and there is no principle better established than what is not judicially presented cannot
be judicially decided. Just as elemental is it that
pleadings a.re the judicial meairt'8 of investing
a court with jurisdiction of the subject matter to
adjudicate it and that a judgment or decree beyond or not within them is a nullity, for the court
is bound by its record. These are immutable elements." (Emphasis added) 67 Utah 428
Defendants respectfully submit that the Nevada Court
did not have jurisdiction to determine matters not raised
by the pleadings and that the Nevada Judgment is a nullity and should not have been given full faith and credit
by the Trial Court.
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B.

THE NEV ADA COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO
RENDER JUDGMENT WHERE PROCEDURAL RULES
OR STATUTES WERE NOT FOLLOWED.

The general rule is well-settled, that a judgment of a
Court of competent jurisdiction may not be attacked collaterally for mere irregularities but only where such judgment is void or where the Court entering it lacked jurisdiction to do so. See 30 A, Am J ur ( J udgrnents), Section
863; Hodson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 14 Utah 402,
47 Pac. 859. If, however, a procedural regulation of the
Court rendering judgment is treated by the law of that
State as a limitation upon the competence of the Court
to act, a judgment rendered without complying with such
rule is invalid in the State of its rendition and is not entitled to recognition in another state as far as the full
faith and credit clause is concerned. Magdanz v. District
aind for Woodbury County, 222 Iowa, 456, 269
Court
NW 498, 108 ALR 377; Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Llewelling, 141 Kansas 350, 41 P (2d) 1032; Grinrod Process
Corporation v. Rothwell, 189 SE 100, West Virginia 1936;
50 Harvard Law Review, 1119, 1114; Goodrich Conflict of
Laws, Third Edition, Section 209, page 613.
It is clear that for the purpose of dismissal of an action for failure to comply with procedural prerequisites,
the courts of Nevada have no power to act without the
occurrence of procedural prerequisites. The early case of
Treadway v. Welder, 12 Nev. 108, held as follows:

"The right of trial by jury is a sacred constitutional right, of which no litigant in a proper case
can be deprived without his consent; and if any of
the material issues, to try which either party has a
20

right to demand a jury, be decided against him by
the court upon proofs admitted without his waiver
of a jury, he is deprived of a substantial right,
guaranteed to him by the Constitution and laws.
A court has not jurisdiction to try an issue which
the Constitution and laws declare shall be tried by
a jury, unless a jury be waived; and if it be tried
by the court when a jury is demanded, the party
against whom a judgment is rendered upon such
an issue, is not bound thereby."
From the facts in the· present case, it appears that
Plaintiffs by means of their counterclaim in the Nevada
Court, did not assert a claim for damages arising out of
the failure to convey property in Colorado, as would be
required by Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 8
(c), 9(b), 9(g), 12(h) and 13(a).
The import of these Rules requires Plaintiffs if they
seek, by way of counterclaim, to assert damages against
Defendant, J. J. Leavitt, for fraudulent failure to convey
property, to set forth such claim affirmatively, with particularity and with damages specifically stated. Such a
claim is a compulsory counterclaim if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of
the Complaint filed in Nevada. Plaintiffs' right to proceed on such a claim, is waived if not asserted in a timely
manner.
The facts of the record before the Court :indicate that
the claim upon which Hillstead and Jackson received
judgment, by way of counterclaim, was never asserted
in any ple·ading before the Eighth Judicial District Court
of the State of Nevada and, in fact, only appears in an
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Affidavit in support of a Motion for Summary Judgment
on pleadings previously filed. It is submitted that under
the laws of the State of Nevada, the Nevada Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment in favor of
Plaintiffs and against Defendant, J. J. Leavitt, in the action then before it.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that this Court
should reverse the Judgment of the Lower Court to the
extent that it affords full faith and credit to the Nevada
Judgment and, further, should sustain the rulings, orders
and judgment of the court insofar as they pertain to the
Second and Third Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Com·
plaint and Plaintiffs' Motion for Garnishee Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
BETTILYON & HOW ARD
F. Burton Howard
Gary A. Weston
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents,
J. J. Leavitt and PR. Leavitt
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